Using identifier tags and authenticity certificates for detecting counterfeited or stolen brand objects

ABSTRACT

A method and system for generating data for use in generating an authenticity certificate. A request is received for a step certificate that authenticates an involvement of the requester entity about an object. The request includes a media identifier, a media key block, an object identifier, a requester entity type of the requester entity, and a requester identity certificate of the requester entity. The object identifier is hashed. A signature is created. A hashing result is generated by hashing a concatenation of the object identifier, the requester entity type, the certifier entity certificate, the requester identity certificate, and the signature. The step certificate is generated and includes the hashing result. The step certificate is encrypted using a random key. The encrypted step certificate and an encrypted random key are sent to the requester entity for subsequent writing the step certificate and the encrypted random key on a media.

This application is a continuation application claiming priority to Ser.No. 12/295,330, filed Sep. 30, 2008, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,447,038, issuedMay 21, 2013.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates generally to method and systems forpreventing counterfeiting and theft of brand objects and morespecifically to a method and systems using RFID, bar code, or the like,used in conjunction with authenticity certificates, for detectingcounterfeited or stolen brand objects, using Content Protection forRecordable Media technology.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Counterfeiting, the illegal manufacturing and selling of brandcopyright-protected articles, poses a huge and still increasing threatto global businesses—including organizations in the life sciences,consumer products, media, luxury goods, and food and beveragesindustries. Likewise, stolen merchandise which are then resold throughtraditional or “parallel” distribution channels seriously affect trademarket in general.

Statistics published by the European Commission show a significantincrease in the amount of counterfeit and pirated articles seized at theEU's external orders in 2003. Customs officials seized almost 100million such articles in 2003 compared with 85 million in 2002, of anestimated value of one billion euros.

More recently, the World Customs Organization estimates counterfeitingaccounts for 5% to 7% of global merchandise trade, equivalent to lostsales of as much as $512 billion in 2004. In terms of numbers, it iscurrently admitted that theft and diversions now affect 1-3% of goods inthe supply chain, and that product counterfeiting accounts for 5-7% ofall global trade. These problems are worsening due to the increasingglobalization process.

Major repercussions of these activities include of course loss ofrevenue for the enterprise, but undermine the trade market globally. Itis threatening branding, intellectual property, and research anddevelopment. It might carry along also a negative impact on brand imagewhen customers eventually realize they are not getting the quality ofproducts they come to expect from the trademark or the quality labelthey thought they own. Counterfeiting and piracy also affect the labormarket, as many jobs are lost as a consequence of these fraudulentactivities.

FIG. 1 depicts a simplified standard process from a merchandisemanufacturing to the merchandise selling, as illustrated with boldarrows. Brand company 100 orders a limited series of objects, or items,to a manufacturer 105. After production of object's series,manufacturer, using a means for transportation 110 (air freight, marinetransport or by road), sends the object's series to a wholesaler 115 whois in charge to dispatch subset of object's series to various trustedretailer 125. Wholesalers use generally transportation by road (120) fordelivery to retailer. Finally, the retailer 125 sells the branded goodsto a customer 130. Today, large distribution companies take in chargethe objects from the manufacturer to the retailer. Thin arrows depictsamples of counterfeited objects and different means to distribute thesecounterfeited objects to customers, as well as branded goods that arestolen before being sold. A counterfeiter 135 produces copies of brandedgoods and via a dishonest dealer 140 distributes said counterfeitedbranded goods directly to the customer 130 or re-injects them in thenormal distribution chain with or without the complicity of a thirdparty working in this normal distribution chain. Re-injection ofcounterfeited branded goods may be done at different levels of thedistribution chain as the transit 110, the wholesaler 115, thedistribution 120, or finally the retailer 125. So, even if a customerbuys a branded good in a shop, he/she has no guaranty about theauthenticity of said branded object. Likewise, branded goods stealingmay be done at different levels of the chain by thief 145: in themanufacturer area 105 or in the distribution chain at the transit 110,the wholesaler 115, the distribution 120, or finally the retailer 125.Customer 130 who buys this stolen branded good, generally knows that theobject has been stolen.

Whatever the way looking at it, counterfeit and theft problems can't andwon't be totally eliminated. So the only reasonable objective thenconsists in trying to keep them under control, by raising the barriersto casual violations, and by requiring a concerted and even more complexeffort by attackers.

The scale of the threat is prompting new efforts by multinationals tostop, or at least curb, the spread of counterfeits. Steps have beentaken to protect by law, which can be a disincentive for some potentialviolators of rights. Companies are also more and more pressuringgovernments to crack down on counterfeiting, trying to ensure a way toprotect Intellectual Property.

There is a need to help brand companies to implement solutions based onproven prevention, detection, and response strategies and tactics.

As factories across the world gain experience with high-endmanufacturing, counterfeits have become more sophisticated as well.Counterfeiters have become so proficient that it can take an expert torecognize a fake product.

This is one of the reasons why IT-based solutions are envisioned asgreat technological contributors in acting against counterfeiters,putting innovation to work to protect a global economy itself driven byinnovation.

Some solutions using electronic tagging are being experimented today inspecific industries. For instance, a company has developed an electronicpedigree software and provides the expertise to safeguard and secure thepharmaceutical supply chain. This pedigree system, based on a RadioFrequency Identifier (RFID) tag with a unique Electronic Product Code(EPC), tracks all the information about a product as it moves throughthe supply chain, from the manufacturer all the way to the point ofsale. Although this methodology represents a step forward in the waragainst counterfeiting and theft, a potential limitation rises from thefact that the Pedigree itself could be read and possibly copied orimitated, and then used abusively by fraudulent parties until theillegal procedure is detected and acted upon. A major requirementconsists therefore in relying on a different, and possiblycomplementary, system that will use a strong encryption mechanism toprotect vital product data.

Therefore what seems essential to deploy is a generic—applicable to anytype of manufactured goods—, standard-based and robust way to create andsecurely manage a digital Certificate of Authenticity, that will beencrypted and uniquely bound to the corresponding product and itsaccompanying media—a certificate container—. This Certificate shouldintegrate a proven mechanism for protecting its digital content againstunauthorized copy and reproduction. This Certificate would be used toverify and hopefully guarantee the authenticity of a product through aprocess checking that there is a perfect match between a ProductIdentifier Code and information derived from its Certificate ofAuthenticity.

At the same time, in order for this protection and detection mechanismto be successful, it must be cost-effective to implement, run onlow-cost ‘checking’ devices, and it must be as secure as possible. Italso needs to be easy, if not transparent, to consumers.

Additional objectives might address possibilities to track and reactvery quickly to any violation, potentially trace it back to theoriginator, and to ensure a renewal mechanism without blocking theentire system whenever a situation of fraud is discovered.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Thus, it is a broad object of the invention to remedy the shortcomingsof the prior art as described here above.

It is another object of the invention to provide means for generating anauthenticity certificate comprising at least the encrypted brand objectidentifier and the brand company certificate.

It is still another object of the invention to provide means forencoding transit, wholesaler, and/or delivery identity certificates, aswell as the manufacturer and/or retailer identity certificates, or anyother identity certificate of any party acting in a brand good supplychain, in an authenticity certificate.

It is another object of the invention to provide means to a brandcompany server for encrypting keys and data in an authenticitycertificate, the data containing at least the merchandise identifier andthe identity certificate of a requester of means for authenticating itsinvolvement in the brand good supply chain.

It is still another object of the invention to provide means forcreating authenticity certificates using CPRM like technology.

The accomplishment of these and other related objects is achieved by amethod for generating an authenticity certificate to be stored on amedia, said authenticity certificate being associated with an object forauthenticating said object, said media and said object having each aunique identifier, said media comprising a media key block, said methodcomprising the steps of,

-   -   receiving a request for a step certificate from an entity, the        step certificate authenticating the involvement of said entity        about said object, said request comprising,        -   the identifier of said media and the media key block stored            therein;        -   the identifier of said object;        -   the type of said entity requesting said step certificate;            and,        -   the identity certificate of said entity requesting said step            certificate;    -   generating a random key;    -   hashing said object identifier;    -   creating a signature being the hashing result of said object        identifier, said type of the entity requesting said step        certificate, the identity certificate of the entity certifying        the authenticity of said object, and said identity certificate        of said entity requesting said step certificate;    -   generating a step certificate comprising the hashing result of        said object identifier, the type of the entity requesting said        step certificate, said identity certificate of the entity        certifying the authenticity of said object, said identity        certificate of said entity requesting said step certificate, and        said signature;    -   encrypting said step certificate using said generated random        key;    -   transmitting said random key, said media identifier, and said        media key block to a clearing house;    -   receiving an encrypted random key from said clearing house, said        encrypted random key being based upon said random key, said        media identifier, and said media key block; and,    -   transmitting said encrypted step certificate and said encrypted        random key to be written on said media;    -   and by a method for authenticating an object associated to an        authenticity certificate generated according to the method        described above, said method comprising the steps of,    -   receiving the identifier of the media where is stored said        authenticity certificate and the associated media key block;    -   receiving the identifier of said object to be authenticated,        receiving one encrypted step certificate of said authenticity        certificate;    -   receiving the encrypted random key associated to said one        encrypted step certificate of said authenticity certificate;    -   decrypting said encrypted random key using the identifier of        said media and the associated media key block;    -   decrypting said one encrypted step certificate using said        decrypted random key;    -   extracting the hashing result of the object identifier encoded        within said one decrypted step certificate;    -   hashing the identifier of said object to be authenticated; and,    -   comparing said extracted hashing result of the object identifier        encoded within said one decrypted step certificate and said        hashing result of the identifier of said object to be        authenticated.

Further embodiments of the invention are provided in the appendeddependent claims.

Further advantages of the present invention will become apparent to theones skilled in the art upon examination of the drawings and detaileddescription. It is intended that any additional advantages beincorporated herein.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates the simplified supply chain from a merchandisemanufacturing to the merchandise selling, the distribution chain ofcounterfeited objects, as well as the distribution chain of stolenbranded goods.

FIG. 2 shows a simplified illustrative example of a DVD player deviceand media embedding CPRM features showing how CPRM technology operates.

FIG. 3 shows a branded object and its associated authenticitycertificate.

FIG. 4 depicts a first one of the tables used by the originator brandcompany to manage marked objects and authenticity certificates. Thetable of FIG. 4 is used to record the identifiers of the objects toauthenticate, and their status.

FIG. 5 illustrates a second one of the tables used by the originatorbrand company to manage marked objects and authenticity certificates.The table of FIG. 5 is used to record information relative to themanufacturers of objects to authenticate.

FIG. 6 shows a third one of the tables used by the originator brandcompany to manage marked objects and authenticity certificates. Thetable of FIG. 6 is used to record information relative to the retailersof objects to authenticate.

FIG. 7 depicts an example of the process flow to create the stepcertificate of an authenticity certificate, the step certificate beingrequested by the manufacturer after having manufactured the objects toauthenticate.

FIG. 8 is a flow chart representing the brand company certificatedelivery.

FIG. 9 is a flow chart representing the behavior of the counterfeitdetection system.

FIG. 10 illustrates a block diagram example of the apparatus forcreating authenticity certificates and for detecting counterfeited orstolen objects.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

According to the invention, an identification tag and an authenticitycertificate are associated to the branded goods to be checked fordetecting counterfeiting or theft. Both identification tag andauthenticity certificate are generated at manufacturing time. Theauthenticity certificate is updated by the retailer in the presence ofthe customer. The authenticity certificate, based upon ContentProtection for Recordable Media (CPRM) technology, is not duplicable norforgeable. In a preferred embodiment, the identification tags compriseeither a Radio Frequency Identifier (RFID) tag or a bar code.

The authenticity certificate, stored on a specific media, can not beduplicated thanks to CPRM technology. The authenticity certificate canbe seen as a set of step certificates, maintained by the brand companyto certify that brand good has been manufactured, transported, sold, orthe like, by an authorised party i.e., to authenticated each step of thesupply chain, or selected steps, of the brand good life cycle from themanufacturing to its selling. An authenticity certificate may compriseas many step certificates such as manufacturer certificate or retailercertificate, as required. The authenticity certificate further comprisesgeneral information such as media identifier and media key block.

The method and system of the invention is adapted to detect counterfeitor stolen merchandise. It is based upon,

-   -   a merchandise identifier which is a tag included by the        manufacturer in the object for which the authenticity has to be        guaranteed. This tag may be an optical readable tag like bar        code, a Radio Frequency IDentifier (RFID), or any other tag        readable by wired or wireless means;    -   an Authenticity Certificate (AC) generated at manufacturing time        and updated at least by the retailer in the presence of the        customer. Information's recorded on this certificate are        generated by the brand company, thanks to a clearing house that        generates an encrypted title key for each step certificate.        Authenticity certificate is not duplicable nor forgeable. It is        based on a CPRM like technology allowing the data to be        encrypted with a random key, referred to as title key, such        title key being encrypted with the hashing of a unique key        called media key concatenated to the media identifier.        Authenticity certificate contains several step certificates with        their associated encrypted title keys. It must contain at least        a step certificate for the manufacturer and an other one for the        retailer to authenticate associated good and to certify it has        been properly sold. Step certificate contains,        -   the result of the hashing of the manufactured object            identifier (allowing the object identifier to be unreadable            and undeterminable, and to prevent the creation of            counterfeited object with an object identifier corresponding            to a stolen authenticity certificate);        -   the requester identity certificate e.g., manufacturer or            retailer;        -   the requester type e.g., “manufacturer”, “retailer”, or any            other party involved in the supply chain;        -   the brand company identity certificate; and,        -   other information such as manufacturing and sale date may be            recorded for traceability purpose;        -   the signature which is the result of the hashing of all the            previous data encrypted with the brand company private key.

The apparatuses according to the invention for creating and updatingauthenticity certificates, and for detecting counterfeited or stolenobjects comprise,

-   -   AC Creator (ACC), which may be a computer or a handled device        equipped with,        -   means to connect the authenticity certificates media;        -   means to read from and to write to the authenticity            certificates media (read both the media identifier and the            media key block; write both the encrypted title key and the            encrypted authenticity certificate);        -   means to read the object identifier; and,        -   means to communicate with the brand company server;    -   AC Fraud Detector (ACFD), which may be a computer or a hand-held        device equipped with,        -   means to connect the authenticity certificates media;        -   means to read from the authenticity certificates media the            media identifier (media ID), the Media Key Block (MKB), the            encrypted title key, and the encrypted step certificates;        -   means to read the object identifier; and,        -   means to determine counterfeited or stolen object.

For sake of clarity it is assumed that,

-   -   a media ID is an identifier that is unique to each recordable        media used for storing authenticity certificate. It is used to        cryptographically bind content to that instance of recordable        media and to prevent indiscriminate copying to other media;    -   a media key is a key that is used to unlock the title keys        stored on a media that contains data protected by CPRM. The        media key can be computed by successfully processing a MKB;    -   a Media Key Block (MKB) is a critical component of the key        management system. The MKB is a data block that provides access        to a common key (media key) that can be accessed by any device        containing the necessary secret keys, that is not revoked;    -   a title key is the key used to encrypt data;    -   an object ID is a code which identifies uniquely a branded good;    -   an Authenticity Certificate (AC) is a certificate which proofs        the authenticity of a branded good at the manufacturing and        retailer levels;    -   an identity certificate is a certificate which proofs the        authenticity of its owner e.g., the manufacturer; and,    -   a step certificate is a certificate which proofs the validity of        a step in the supply chain e.g., to proof that an object has        been validly manufactured by an authorised manufacturer.

Content Protection for Recordable Media (CPRM)

Content Protection for Recordable Media (CPRM) defines a renewablemethod for protecting content recorded on a number of physical mediatypes such as,

-   -   DVD Book;    -   portable ATA Storage Book; and,    -   Secure Digital (SD) Memory Card Book.

The use of this specification and access to the intellectual propertyand cryptographic materials required to implement it is subject of alicense. License authority, known as the 4C Entity, LLC, is responsiblefor establishing and administering the content protection system basedin part on this specification.

CPRM technology is designed to meet the following general criteria,

-   -   meeting the content owners' requirements for robustness and        system renewability;    -   applicable for both audio and video content;    -   equally suitable for implementation on personal computer and        hand-held devices; and,    -   applicable to different media types.

The system is based on the following technical elements,

-   -   key management for interchangeable media;    -   content encryption; and,    -   media based renewability.

FIG. 2 shows a simplified illustrative example of a DVD player device200 and a DVD media 210 embedding CPRM features showing how the systemoperates. The actual details of component storage and cryptographic keymanagement will vary with different types of DVD and other supportedmedia, as well as with different applications, as described in the otherbooks of this specification.

The 4C Entity, LLC provides secret device keys 205 to the devicemanufacturer for inclusion into each device produced 200.

Media manufacturers place a media identifier 215 and media key block 220generated by the 4C Entity, LLC on each piece of compliant media 210.

Content 230 stored on the media is encrypted and decrypted by a mediakey derived from a one-way function of an encrypted title key 225 andthe Copy Control Information (CCI) associated with the content. Thetitle key 225 is encrypted and stored on the media 210 using a keyderived from a one-way function of the media key block 220 and mediaidentifier 215. Again, actual details of key management can vary amongdifferent applications, as described in the other books of thisspecification.

Media 210 may also comprise unrecorded areas 235 and a pre-embossedlead-in area 240.

When compliant media 210 is placed within a compliant drive orplayer/recorder 200, a secret media key is generated by the device usingits secret device keys 205 and the media key block 220 stored on themedia itself. The same secret media key is generated regardless of whichcompliant device is used to access the media.

The process of decrypting content stored on a DVD-R or DVD-RW protectedwith CPRM, is as follows,

-   -   once the media key has been generated, the playback device (in        this particular case, a DVD Player) reads the media identifier        from the disc and calculates the media unique key using a        cryptographic one-way function;    -   the playback device reads the encrypted title key resident on        the disc, and calculates the original title key using the C2        cipher function in ECB Mode;    -   the content key is then derived from another one-way        cryptographic function based on the title key;    -   the resulting content key, after precise conditions are        cryptographically verified using copy control information        associated with the content, is finally used to decrypt the        audiovisual content.

RFID Systems

As mentioned above, one of the embodiment of the invention is base uponthe use of RFID. The core of any RFID system is the ‘Tag’ or‘Transponder’, which can be attached to or embedded within objects,wherein data can be stored. An RFID reader sends out a radio frequencysignal to the RFID tag that broadcasts back its stored data to thereader. The system works basically as two separate antennas, one on theRFID tag and the other on the reader. The read data can either betransmitted directly to another system like a host computer throughstandard interfaces, or it can be stored in a portable reader and lateruploaded to the computer for data processing. An RFID tag system workseffectively in environments with excessive dirt, dust, moisture, and/orpoor visibility. It generally overcomes the limitations of otherautomatic identification approaches.

Basically, the reader antenna emits a signal that is received by an RFIDtag. The signal is reflected in the RFID tag and re-emitted, thereflected signal being modulated according to the data stored within thetag.

Method and System for Detecting Counterfeited and Stolen Objects

FIG. 3 shows a branded object 300 and its associated authenticitycertificate 305 (paper representation). The branded object contains apair of identifiers. The first identifier is an object identifier(object ID) 310 which may be recorded in an RFID tag as shown, anoptically readable code bar, or any other power less support readable bywireless means. This object identifier is a unique reference associatedto the branded good and is used to certify the authenticity of saidbranded good. The second identifier is an authenticity certificatecorrelation identifier (AC correlation ID) 315, allowing to associate anelementary certificate with the corresponding branded good in the casewhere the authenticity certificate transits from the manufacturer to theretailer by different means than the branded good. This AC correlationID may be human readable (printing, labeling), readable by optical orelectronic means (code bar, RFID or any other power less supportreadable by wireless means), or both. This AC correlation ID 315 can beon the same support than the object ID 310. The authenticity certificate320 is labeled with the AC correlation ID 325. Like the authenticitycertificate of the branded good, the authenticity correlation ID 325 ishuman, optically or electronically readable. Main information recordedon the authenticity certificate 320 are:

-   -   the media identifier (media ID);    -   the media key block (MKB);    -   encrypted step certificates, each having,        -   the result of hashing the manufactured object identifier            (that turns the object identifier as unreadable,            incalculable and prevents to create counterfeited objects            with the object identifier corresponding to a stolen            authenticity certificate);        -   the requester certificate (e.g. manufacturer or retailer            certificate);        -   the requester type (“manufacturer” or “retailer”);        -   the brand certificate;        -   other information such as manufacturing and sale date as            well as elementary certificates of all intermediary parties            between the manufacturer and the retailer may be recorded            for traceability purpose; and,        -   the signature which is the result of hashing all previous            data encrypted with the brand private key; and,    -   encrypted random keys corresponding to each encrypted step        certificate.

FIGS. 4, 5, and 6 show the tables used by the brand company computer orserver for delivering authenticity certificates. Brand good table 400 ofFIG. 4 is used to record all object ID and their status. As soon as abrand company orders to a manufacturer a set of goods, the list ofobject ID delivered by the brand company is recorded in the field 405.When the manufacturer requests an authenticity certificate, the field“made” 410 corresponding to this object ID is set to “true” and thefield “manufacturer ID” 420 and “manufacturing date” 425 are filled.Likewise, when a retailer sells the brand good and requests anauthenticity certificate, the field “sold” 415 is set to true and fields“retailer ID” 430 and “sell date” 435 are updated. Field “revoked” 440indicates that the object ID has been invalided. Table 400 may comprisefurther columns e.g., column 445 for storing miscellaneous informationrelated to delivery process.

FIG. 5 depicts the manufacturer table 500. Field “manuf ID” 505indicates the unique manufacturer identifier. This identifier is used toassociate an object ID to a manufacturer in the brand good table 400,described above. Other fields give complete information about themanufacturer such as the complete name 510, his postal address 515, hisphone number 520, and his electronic mail address 525. Other informationbelonging to this manufacturer like fax number and some legalidentifiers may also be recorded, starting from field 535. Field“revoked” 530 is set to true as soon as the manufacturer has beenrevoked by the brand company.

FIG. 6 depicts the retailer table 600. Field “retailer ID” 605 indicatesthe unique retailer identifier. This identifier is used to associate anobject ID to the retailer who sold this brand object in the brand goodtable 400. Other fields give complete information about the retailersuch as the complete name 610, his postal address 615, his phone number620, and his electronic mail address 625. Other information belonging tothis retailer like fax number and some legal identifiers may also berecorded, starting from field 635. Field “revoked” 630 is set to true assoon as the retailer has been revoked by the brand company.

FIG. 7 depicts the messages flow to get a step certificate requested bya manufacturer to authenticate a brand good. Brand company 705 orders tomanufacturer 710 a set of brand goods and provides the manufacturer 710with a set of object identifiers (step 725) to be associated to thebrand goods. When an object has been manufactured and the objectidentifier is inserted in it, a step certificate is created. To thatend, the manufacturer 710 reads (step 730) the media information writtenon the authenticity certificate 715 e.g., a SD memory card, that returns(step 735) the media identifier (media ID) and the media key block(MKB). In turn, object identifier is read (steps 740 and 745) on thebrand good 720. When all necessary information has been collected i.e.,media ID, MKB, and object ID, the step certificate requester i.e., themanufacturer, sends a message requesting authenticity certificate (step750). This request contains media ID, MKB, object ID, the manufactureridentity certificate and a signature corresponding to the hashing of theconcatenation of previous information's encrypted with the private keyof the manufacturer. After having controlled the validity of thereceived data, a computer or server of the brand 705 creates a stepcertificate (SC) using object ID, brand certificate, manufactureridentity certificate and a signature corresponding to the hashing of theconcatenation of the previous information's encrypted with the brandcompany private key. Then, brand company computer or server encrypts thestep certificate with a random key Rk so as to transmit securely thedata (step 755). At this stage, brand company computer or server sends arequest to a clearing house 700 for encrypting, according to CPRM rules,the random key Rk using media ID, MKB and the random key Rk (step 760).Clearing house 700 encrypts the random key Rk by hashing media ID andthe media unique key, and returns the result to the brand companycomputer or server (step 765). Finally, brand company 705 transmitsencrypted random key Rk and encrypted step certificate to requester(step 770). The encrypted random key Rk and encrypted SC are thenwritten into the authenticity certificate (step 775), using CPRMfunction. As suggested by box 780, the same process applies when theretailer, or any party involved in the supply chain, requests a stepcertificate.

The brand company process and related operations for sending a stepcertificate are described in the method illustrated by the flow chart ofFIG. 8 that includes the following steps,

-   -   step 800: the method starts upon request for generating a step        certificate;    -   step 805: the brand company receives from the requester a        request to get a step certificate, containing a media ID, a        media key block (MKB), an object ID, requester identity        certificate, and a signature which is a hashing of the        concatenation of all arguments transmitted in the message (media        ID, MKB, object ID and requester identity certificate). The        requester is either the manufacturer, the vendor, or anyone who        asks a step certificate;    -   step 810: the object table e.g., object table 400 of FIG. 4, is        scanned in order to determine the validity of the object ID;    -   step 815: a test is performed to determine whether or not a        valid entry is associated to the referenced object ID in the        object table. If there is a valid entry, control is given to        step 820 else, control is given to step 870;    -   step 820: values of H1 and H2 are computed. H1 is the result of        a cryptographic hash function which processes the original input        message containing media ID, MKB, object ID and requester        identity certificate to compute a resulting message digest. H2        is the result of a function, using the public key extracted from        the caller's identity certificate, decrypting the signature of        the message originally calculated by the requester using the        same H1 hashing function for which the result has been encrypted        by the requester using his/her own private key. These functions        implement both the public/private key encryption and the        public/private digital signature mechanisms for confidentiality        and authentication purposes;    -   step 825: a test is performed by comparing values H1 and H2. If        results are identical, meaning that the signature can be        verified and certified (which guarantees that the message        originates from the referenced requester and that it has not        been altered), control is then given to step 830 otherwise,        control is given to step 870;    -   step 830: a test is performed to determine whether or not the        requester is actually known and referenced as a manufacturer by        checking the manufacturer table 500. If the requester is known,        control is given to step 835 else control is given to step 860;    -   step 835: a subsequent test is performed to check if the        referenced object ID was actually allocated to this particular        manufacturer and if the manufacturer has not been revoked. If it        is true, then control is given to step 840 otherwise, control is        given to step 870;    -   step 840: another test is performed to determine if the object        corresponding to object ID has already been manufactured or not,        and if the object ID has not been revoked. If the state of not        being manufactured is proven right and the object ID has not        been revoked, then control is given to step 845, otherwise        control is given to step 870;    -   step 845: the object is set in “manufactured” state by setting        the Boolean variable to true;    -   step 850: after verifications have been done, the brand company        calculates and generates an encrypted step certificate for this        particular object;    -   step 855: the brand company sends the step certificate to the        requester, using a secure transmission mechanism over the        network;    -   step 860: as a result of knowing that the requester is not a        manufacturer, another test is done to determine whether or not        the specified object has already been manufactured. If the state        of not being manufactured is proven right, control is given to        step 865 otherwise, control is given to step 863;    -   step 863: a test is done to verify whether or not the requester        is a revoked retailer. If it is the case control is given to        step 865 for rejecting the step certificate request else,        control is given to step 850 for computing and sending back the        certificate;    -   both steps 865 and 870: the requester is informed that request        is rejected, none step certificate is transmitted. The process        loops back to the starting point to wait for the next request.        An error code may be returned to the requester such as “Unknown        object ID”, “Manufacturer step certificate already delivered for        object Id”, or any other detectable condition.

As it can be understood by reading the flow chart, several stepcertificates other than the ones requested by the manufacturer and/orthe retailer may be written on the authenticity certificate. These otherstep certificates are obviously valid if the manufacturer and retailerstep certificates are valid, but they may be used in case of stolenmerchandise to determine in which step of the supply chain the roboccurred.

An example of the authenticity verification process and relatedoperations is illustrated by the flow chart of FIG. 9. The depictedalgorithm includes the following steps:

-   -   step 900: the method starts upon receiving a request for        verifying a brand step certificate;    -   step 905: all the data of the authenticity certificate are read.        These data are media ID, MKB, and all couple of encrypted step        certificates and their associated encrypted title keys which are        set as an array “Vc”. Variable Vcount is initialized with the        size of the array containing the newly read step certificates;    -   step 910: object ID is read using means corresponding to the        used technology e.g., an optical reader if the object ID is        represented by a bar code, a RFID reader when object ID is the        signature of a RFID, or any other mean;    -   step 915: local Boolean “Manufactured” and “Sold” bits are        initialized to “False” and, the object table is scanned in order        to determine the validity of the object ID. Variable Vindx is        initialized to address the first entry of the array containing        the step certificates;    -   step 920: a test is performed to check whether or not all step        certificates have been processed. If all the step certificates        have not been processed, control is given to step 925. When all        step certificates have been processed, the status of the        selected step certificate is examined, starting at step 980;    -   step 925: the encrypted step certificate is decrypted using        encrypted title key, media ID, and MKB. Then, variables are        initialized with values retrieved from the decrypted step        certificate: Hoi is initialized with the result of the hashing        of object ID and Cs is initialized with the signature which is        the result of the hashing of the following data encrypted with        the brand company private key:        -   the hashing of the manufactured object ID (that turns the            object ID unreadable and undeterminable, and prevents            creating counterfeited object with an object identifier            corresponding to a stolen authenticity certificate);        -   the requester identity certificate e.g., manufacturer or            retailer;        -   the requester type e.g., “Manufacturer” or “Retailer”;        -   the brand company identity certificate;        -   other information such as manufacturing and sale date as            well as step certificates of all intermediary parties            between the manufacturer and the retailer that may be            recorded for traceability purpose;    -   Bpuk is set to the brand company public key extracted from the        brand company identity certificate;    -   Requester type is initialized with the requester type specified        in the step certificate being processed;    -   step 930; the hashing result “Hc” of the decoded step        certificate excluding its signature is computed while the        hashing result “Hs” is computed as the decryption of the step        certificate signature using the brand company public key “Bpuk”;    -   step 935: newly computed hashing result “Hc” is compared to the        hashing result “Hs” received in the signature to verify that the        step certificate has not been corrupted. If they match (meaning        that the step certificate is not corrupted), then control is        given to step 940; otherwise the step certificate is ignored and        control is given to step 945;    -   step 940: a comparison is done between the result of the hashing        of object ID read at step 910 on the branded object and the        result of the hashing of object ID retrieved from the step        certificate at step 925. If the two hashing results are equal,        the step certificate is valid and the process continues at step        941, otherwise the step certificate is ignored and the process        continues at step 945;    -   step 941: if the requester is a manufacturer, then control is        given to step 942, otherwise control is given to step 955;    -   step 942: the Boolean manufactured bit is set to “True” to        indicate that branded object is not a counterfeited object;    -   step 945: variable Vindx is incremented to address the next        entry of the array containing the step certificates and the        process loops to step 920 for examining the next step        certificate found on the authenticity certificate;    -   step 955: if the requester type is a retailer, then control is        given to step 960, otherwise control is given to step 945;    -   step 960: the Boolean Sold bit is set to “True” and the process        continues at step 945 for examining the next step certificate        found on the authenticity certificate;    -   step 980: when all step certificates are processed, a test is        performed to check if the Boolean “Manufactured” is equal to        “True”. If it is the case, then control is given to step 981;        otherwise control is given to step 965;    -   step 965: the object being not associated to a valid        manufacturer identity certificate, a warning is generated e.g.,        the message “Counterfeited object” is displayed on the screen of        the authenticity verification equipment and control is given to        step 970;    -   step 970: the process is ended;    -   step 981: a test is performed to check if the Boolean “Sold” bit        is “False”. If it is the case, control is given to step 985;        otherwise control is given to step 990;    -   step 985: a warning is generated e.g., the message “Stolen        object” is displayed on the screen of the authenticity        verification equipment and control is given to step 970; and,    -   step 990: as the object is indicated as sold, a corresponding        indication is done e.g., the message “Authentic object” is        displayed on the screen of the authenticity verification        equipment and control is given to step 970.

FIG. 10 illustrates a block diagram example of a CPRM enabled computersystem 1000 for creating, reading, and validating the authenticitycertificates. Computer system 1000 e.g., an IBM-compatible personalcomputer or a hand-held device, comprises a central processor 1005, amain memory 1010, an input/output controller 1015, a keyboard 1020, apointing device 1025 e.g., a mouse, a track ball, or a pen device, adisplay device 1030, and a mass storage 1035 e.g., hard disk. Additionalinput/output devices, such as a printing device 1040, can be included inthe computer system 1000 as desired. According to a preferredembodiment, the computer system 1000 further comprises a RFID reader1045, a bar code reader, or any other means adapted to read the objectidentifier, and a SD card memory reader 1050 (or the reader adapted toaccess the CPRM compliant memory device storing the authenticitycertificates). These two readers can be grouped in an independentapparatus connected to the computer by a wired mean such as a USB portor short range wireless link such as radio or infrared links. Asillustrated, the various components of the computer system 1000preferably communicate through a system bus 1055 or similararchitecture. A computer software is provided for directing theoperation of the computer system 1000. Such software, preferably storedin main memory 1010 and/or on mass storage 1035, includes a kernel, oroperating system, and a shell, or interface. This software can be loadedi.e., transferred, from mass storage 1035 to main memory 1010, forexecution. The computer system 1000 receives user commands and datathrough user interface, preferably a graphical user interface (GUI),that is also used to display results.

Naturally, in order to satisfy local and specific requirements, a personskilled in the art may apply to the solution described above manymodifications and alterations all of which, however, are included withinthe scope of protection of the invention as defined by the followingclaims. In particular, the invention can be implemented with any CPRMtechnology variant, such as the Advanced Access Content System (AACS) orthe likes.

The invention claimed is:
 1. A method for generating data for use ingenerating an authenticity certificate to be stored on a media, saidmethod comprising: receiving, by a central processor of a computersystem from a requester entity, a request for a step certificate, saidstep certificate authenticating an involvement of the requester entityabout an object, said request comprising a media identifier, a media keyblock, an object identifier, a requester entity type of the requesterentity, and a requester identity certificate of the requester entity,wherein the object identifier identifies the object and is unique to theobject, wherein the media identifier identifies the media and is uniqueto the media, wherein the media key block is a data block of the mediaproviding access to a media key used to unlock a title key stored on themedia, and wherein the title key is configured to encrypt data stored onthe media; after said receiving the request, said central processorhashing the object identifier; after said hashing the object identifier,said central processor creating a signature comprising the hashed objectidentifier, the requester entity type, a certifier identity certificateof a certifier entity that has certified the authenticity of the object,and the requester identity certificate; said central processorgenerating a hashing result by hashing a concatenation of the objectidentifier, the requester entity type, the certifier entity certificate,the requester identity certificate, and the signature; said centralprocessor generating the step certificate comprising the hashing result;said central processor encrypting the step certificate using a randomkey; and said central processor sending the encrypted step certificateand an encrypted random key to the requester entity for subsequentwriting the step certificate and the encrypted random key on the media,said encrypted random key being based upon the random key, the mediaidentifier, and the media key block.
 2. The method of claim 1, whereinthe method further comprises: after said encrypting the stepcertificate, said central processor transmitting the random key, themedia identifier, and the media key block to a clearing house; and aftersaid transmitting the random key, the media identifier, and the mediakey block, said central processor receiving the encrypted random keyfrom the clearing house.
 3. The method of claim 1, said method furthercomprising: said central processor verifying a validity of the receivedobject identifier, wherein said verifying the validity of the receivedobject identifier comprises scanning an object table, wherein saidscanning comprises determining that the object identifier exist as anentry in an objectID column of the object table, and wherein theobjectID column comprises an object identifier of a different object foreach different row of a plurality of rows of the table.
 4. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the method further comprises: said central processordetermining that a manufacturer has manufactured the object, and whereinthe requester entity is the manufacturer.
 5. The method of claim 1, saidmethod further comprising: after said receiving the request, saidcentral processor verifying the signature, said verifying the signaturecomprising: generating a first hash result (H1) by applying a hashfunction to an input message comprising the media identifier, the mediakey block, the object identifier, and the requester identitycertificate; extracting a public key from the requestor identitycertificate, said requestor identity certificate having been encryptedby a private key of the requester, said public key and said private keybeing a public/private key pair; decrypting a signature of the inputmessage through use of the public key; generating a second hash result(H2) by applying the hash function to the decrypted signature of theinput message; and determining that H1 and H2 are identical.
 6. Acomputer readable hardware storage device comprising instructions thatwhen executed on a central processor of a computer system performs amethod for generating data for use in generating an authenticitycertificate to be stored on a media, said method comprising: saidcentral processor receiving, from a requester entity, a request for astep certificate, said step certificate authenticating an involvement ofthe requester entity about an object, said request comprising a mediaidentifier, a media key block, an object identifier, a requester entitytype of the requester entity, and a requester identity certificate ofthe requester entity, wherein the media comprises the media identifierand the media key block, wherein the object identifier identifies theobject and is unique to the object, wherein the media identifieridentifies the media and is unique to the media, wherein the media keyblock is a data block of the media providing access to a media key usedto unlock a title key stored on the media, and wherein the title key isconfigured to encrypt data stored on the media; after said receiving therequest, said central processor hashing the object identifier; aftersaid hashing the object identifier, said central processor creating asignature comprising the hashed object identifier, the requester entitytype, a certifier identity certificate of a certifier entity that hascertified the authenticity of the object, and the requester identitycertificate; said central processor generating a hashing result byhashing a concatenation of the object identifier, the requester entitytype, the certifier entity certificate, the requester identitycertificate, and the signature; said central processor generating thestep certificate comprising the hashing result; said central processorencrypting the step certificate using a random key; and said centralprocessor sending the encrypted step certificate and an encrypted randomkey to the requester entity for subsequent writing the step certificateand the encrypted random key on the media, said encrypted random keybeing based upon the random key, the media identifier, and the media keyblock.
 7. The hardware storage device of claim 6, wherein the methodfurther comprises: after said encrypting the step certificate, saidcentral processor transmitting the random key, the media identifier, andthe media key block to a clearing house; and after said transmitting therandom key, the media identifier, and the media key block, said centralprocessor receiving the encrypted random key from the clearing house. 8.The hardware storage device of claim 6, said method further comprising:said central processor verifying a validity of the received objectidentifier, wherein said verifying the validity of the received objectidentifier comprises scanning an object table, wherein said scanningcomprises determining that the object identifier exist as an entry in anobjectID column of the object table, and wherein the objectID columncomprises an object identifier of a different object for each differentrow of a plurality of rows of the table.
 9. The hardware storage deviceof claim 6, wherein the method further comprises: said central processordetermining that a manufacturer has manufactured the object, and whereinthe requester entity is the manufacturer.
 10. The hardware storagedevice of claim 6, said method further comprising: after said receivingthe request, said central processor verifying the signature, saidverifying the signature comprising: generating a first hash result (H1)by applying a hash function to an input message comprising the mediaidentifier, the media key block, the object identifier, and therequester identity certificate; extracting a public key from therequestor identity certificate, said requestor identity certificatehaving been encrypted by a private key of the requester, said public keyand said private key being a public/private key pair; decrypting asignature of the input message through use of the public key; generatinga second hash result (H2) by applying the hash function to the decryptedsignature of the input message; and determining that H1 and H2 areidentical.
 11. A computer system comprising a central processor, amemory coupled to the central processor, and a computer readable storagedevice coupled to the central processor, said storage device containinginstructions which, upon being executed by the central processor via thememory, implements a method for generating data for use in generating anauthenticity certificate to be stored on a media, said methodcomprising: said central processor receiving, from a requester entity, arequest for a step certificate, said step certificate authenticating aninvolvement of the requester entity about an object, said requestcomprising a media identifier, a media key block, an object identifier,a requester entity type of the requester entity, and a requesteridentity certificate of the requester entity, wherein the objectidentifier identifies the object and is unique to the object, whereinthe media identifier identifies the media and is unique to the media,wherein the media key block is a data block of the media providingaccess to a media key used to unlock a title key stored on the media,and wherein the title key is configured to encrypt data stored on themedia; after said receiving the request, said central processor hashingthe object identifier; after said hashing the object identifier, saidcentral processor creating a signature comprising the hashed objectidentifier, the requester entity type, a certifier identity certificateof a certifier entity that has certified the authenticity of the object,and the requester identity certificate; said central processorgenerating a hashing result by hashing a concatenation of the objectidentifier, the requester entity type, the certifier entity certificate,the requester identity certificate, and the signature; said centralprocessor generating the step certificate comprising the hashing result;said central processor encrypting the step certificate using a randomkey; and said central processor sending the encrypted step certificateand an encrypted random key to the requester entity for subsequentwriting the step certificate and the encrypted random key on the media,said encrypted random key being based upon the random key, the mediaidentifier, and the media key block.
 12. The computer system of claim11, wherein the method further comprises: after said encrypting the stepcertificate, said central processor transmitting the random key, themedia identifier, and the media key block to a clearing house; and aftersaid transmitting the random key, the media identifier, and the mediakey block, said central processor receiving the encrypted random keyfrom the clearing house.
 13. The computer system of claim 11, saidmethod further comprising: said central processor verifying a validityof the received object identifier, wherein said verifying the validityof the received object identifier comprises scanning an object table,wherein said scanning comprises determining that the object identifierexist as an entry in an objectID column of the object table, and whereinthe objectID column comprises an object identifier of a different objectfor each different row of a plurality of rows of the table.
 14. Thecomputer system of claim 11, wherein the method further comprises: saidcentral processor determining that a manufacturer has manufactured theobject, and wherein the requester entity is the manufacturer.
 15. Thecomputer system of claim 11, said method further comprising: after saidreceiving the request, said central processor verifying the signature,said verifying the signature comprising: generating a first hash result(H1) by applying a hash function to an input message comprising themedia identifier, the media key block, the object identifier, and therequester identity certificate; extracting a public key from therequestor identity certificate, said requestor identity certificatehaving been encrypted by a private key of the requester, said public keyand said private key being a public/private key pair; decrypting asignature of the input message through use of the public key; generatinga second hash result (H2) by applying the hash function to the decryptedsignature of the input message; and determining that H1 and H2 areidentical.